Mohlo by sa vám tiež páčiť

Viac informácií o knihe Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information

• Parametre knihy
• Anotácia kniha
• Obľúbené z iného súdka

Nákupom získate 137 bodov

Anotácia knihy

Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment ŕ la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided.

Parametre knihy

Zaradenie knihy Books in English Economics, finance, business & management Economics

• Celý názov: Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information
• Autor: Alessandra Mainini
• Jazyk: Angličtina
• Väzba: Brožovaná
• Počet strán: 64
• EAN: 9783639371741
• ISBN: 3639371747
• ID: 06843885
• Nakladateľ: VDM Verlag
• Hmotnosť: 104 g
• Rozmery: 229 × 152 × 4 mm
• Dátum vydania: 02. August 2011

Obľúbené z iného súdka

---

---

---